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‘I	thought	I	was	working	class	until	I	went	to	Glasgow’:	sticky	discourse	and	
absence	to	understand	unequal	places.		
Catherine	Doherty	
University	of	Glasgow		
Paper	for	ECER,	Copenhagen	August	2017.	
Presented	in	symposium:	Making	inequality:	ontologies	of	research	into	pedagogy	in	high	poverty	
contexts	
	
Abstract:	
When	told	I	was	moving	to	Glasgow,	my	dentist	promptly	quoted	the	British	sitcom	Porridge:	‘I	
thought	I	was	working	class	until	I	went	to	Glasgow.’	Though	written	in	mid-1970s,	this	joke	remains	
active,	doing	the	work	of	characterising	a	community	from	a	distance,	to	sustain	a	reputation	for	
stark	disadvantage	forty	years	later.	Despite	urban	renewal	and	civic	rebranding,	the	stigma	sticks.	In	
the	same	way	that	categories	of	gender	or	race	precipitate	realities	for	the	coded,	the	reputation	of	
places	travels	before	them	creating	presumptions	that	inform	interactions,	or	avoidance	thereof.	In	
this	paper,	I	use	this	quip	as	a	provocation	to	reflect	on	firstly,	how	researchers	contribute	to	the	
reification	of	inequality,	and	secondly,	how	inequality	is	a	relational	term	that	warrants	enquiry	on	
both	sides	of	the	equation.	I	conclude	by	comparing	these	complex	emergent	and	relational	
ontologies	to	the	flat	world	of	league	tables	and	international	comparisons,	asking	how	such	
‘knowing’	will	act	on	places	from	a	distance.	
This	joke	forces	me	to	think	about	how	my	own	research	in	schools	servicing	disadvantaged	
communities	takes	stigmatised	reputations	as	a	point	of	departure	and	sampling	heuristic.	In	turn	
my	ethnographic	work	re-animates	and	sustains	such	reputations	by	producing	accounts	that	can	
potentially	become	‘causally	efficacious’.	I	borrow	this	phrase	from	Bhaskar’s	(1998)	critical	realist	
philosophy	of	social	science.	This	philosophy	embraces	a	layered	ontology,	including	both	the	
intransitive	dimension	of	the	material	world,	and	the	transitive	dimension	of	discursive	and	
normative	forces,	to	explore	the	interaction	of	forces	and	actualities	in	an	open	system	(Stones,	
1996).	Similarly	Archer’s	(2007)	reflexive	sociology	talks	of	actor’s	‘fallible	readings’	that	inform	
personal	projects.	I’m	interested	in	how	reputations	circulated	in	and	by	educational	research,	
league	tables	and	jokes,	offer	fallible	readings	that	nevertheless	become	causally	efficacious.		
Secondly,	inequality	emerges	between	advantage	and	disadvantage.	Studies	of	relational	inequality	
too	easily	slip	into	studies	of	the	poor,	as	opposed	to	the	co-constitutive	relation	between	the	haves	
and	havenots.	This	means	asking	questions	about	magnet	schools	and	niche	programs	sucking	
talent,	energy	and	capitals	out	of	others.	It	means	we	research	selectivity,	white	flight	and	middle	
class	drift	as	processes	producing	inequality.	Bhaskar’s	attention	to	absence	(Shipway,	2010)	as	an	
emergent	outcome,	and	absenting	to	understand	change,	might	build	explanations	beyond	what	is	
present	in	stigmatised	sites.		
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Introduction	
…	we	perhaps	ought	to	ask	whether	context	is	discovered	or	constructed;	and,	if	it	is	
constructed,	whether	it	is	constructed	by	the	participants	or	by	the	analyst.	(Hammersley,	
2006,	p.6).	
the	'objective'		detachment	of	positivism	pervades	reports	and	policies,	when	the	authors	
inevitably	select	and	re-present	their	data,	and	when	they	ignore	their	own	part	in	the	long	
history	of	official	mistrust	of	the	'feckless'	poor,	which	still	drives	public	policy.	(Alderson,	
2013,	p.	33)	
	
When	told	I	was	moving	to	Glasgow,	my	Australian	dentist	promptly	quoted	the	British	sitcom	
Porridge	to	me:	‘I	thought	I	was	working	class	until	I	went	to	Glasgow.’	Though	written	in	the	mid-
1970s,	this	joke	remains	active	forty	years	later,	doing	the	work	of	characterising	a	community	from	
a	distance,	to	sustain	a	pejorative	reputation	for	stark	disadvantage.	Despite	urban	renewal	
programs,	new	populations	and	civic	rebranding	efforts,	that	stigma	and	its	presumptions	still	
circulate	and	do	work	in	the	wider	social	imaginary	–	reputations	are	sticky	discourse.	This	got	me	
thinking	about	how	places	are	(re)produced	in	discourse	invoked	elsewhere	by	others,	the	impact	
and	effect	of	such	widely	circulated	accounts,	and	my	complicity	as	an	educational	ethnographer	in	
these	reputations	and	their	effects	of	notoriety.		
My	interest	is	hence	around	the	work	of	representations,	be	they	fictional	or	factual,	and	their	
second	order	but	constitutive	effects	on	communities.	More	particularly	I’m	interested	in	their	
contribution	to	creating	absences	that	impact	on	disadvantaged	communities,	that	is,	the	diminished	
and	inequitable	realities	such	accounts	can	precipitate.	In	this	way,	I	am	connecting	with	
ethnography’s	ongoing	wrestle	with	the	ethics	and	politics	of	representation.	In	another	way,	I	am	
also	connecting	with	current	debates	grappling	with	the	onto-epistemological	puzzle	in	accounting	
for	how	our	work	as	researchers	produces	the	matter	which	we	seek	to	know	–	in	this	case,	
inequality.		Both	of	these	pose	a	number	of	methodological	conundrums.	I	will	argue	that	the	
metatheoretical	premises	of	critical	realism,	rather	than	those	of	new	materialism,	help	me	
negotiate	these	conundrums.	
In	this	paper,	I	reflect	firstly	on	the	power	of	representations	through	the	example	of	Glasgow.	I’m	
interested	in	the	way	that	fictional	or	factual	representations	of	places	create	truth	effects,	then	
how	the	representations	of	places	and	populations	that	researchers	produce	also	contribute	to	the	
reification	of	inequality	over	time.	I	then	turn	to	consider	how	inequality	is,	at	heart,	a	relational	
term	that	demands	enquiry	on	both	sides	of	its	equation.	I	conclude	by	comparing	these	complex	
discursive,	emergent	and	relational	ontologies	to	the	flat	world	of	league	tables	and	international	
comparisons,	asking	how	such	reductive	but	influential	representations	can	act	on	places	from	a	
distance	to	exacerbate	inequalities	by	encouraging	absence.	
Imagined	Glasgows	and	the	problem	of	notoriety.		
As	a	recent	arrival,	I	find	myself	a	consumer	of	ethnographic	accounts.	I’m	reliant	on,	and	hungry	for,	
representations	of	Glasgow	to	give	me	some	sense	of	the	historical	trajectories	and	collective	
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sensibilities	that	I	am	now	located	in.	I	have	sought	out	both	fictional	and	factual	accounts.	I	started	
with	the	iconic	novel,	No	Mean	City	(McArthur	&	Kingsley	Long,	1957)	with	its	anti-hero,	razor	
violence	and	poverty-porn,	first	published	in	1935.	It	offers	a	thinly	veiled	auto-ethnographic	
account	of	lives	lived	in	the	notorious	Gorbals	district	(how	is	it	that	I	already	knew	what	‘the	
Gorbals’	should	connote?).	This	is	work	that	is	comparable	to	the	ethnographic	fiction	of	Amitav	
Ghosh	in	its	rich	description	of	place	and	community	zeitgeist.	The	characters	are	observed	with	
both	a	tenderness	in	understanding	the	people’s	constraints	and	modest	aspirations,	and	a	cynically	
politicised	eye	on	their	conditions	and	prospects.		
The	novel	and	the	‘truth’	about	Glasgow	it	exported	immediately	attracted	protest	from	middle	class	
citizens	and	critiques	in	the	local	newspapers:	
	Unfortunately,	it	seems	to	us	that	the	book	may	positively	be	harmful.	The	reputation	of	our	
city	is	undeservedly	evil		…	magnified	beyond	all	reason	…	Glasgow	has	got	a	bad	name,	and	
Glasgow	is	suffering	because	of	that	bad	name;	and	this	book,	which	is	widely	noticed	in	the	
Press,	will	tend	to	confirm	the	evil	reputation	of	our	city.	…	The	very	fidelity	of	the	picture	
will	convince	those	who	have	no	personal	contact	with	life	in	the	slums	of	a	manufacturing	
town	that	Glasgow	must	be	worse	than	any	other	city,	for,	they	will	say,	surely	nothing	so	
horrible	can	exist	anywhere	else.	(quoted	from	the	Glasgow	Evening	Citizen,	28	October	
1935,	in		McKean,	1990,	pp.	31-32)		
Though	banned	from	local	libraries,	and	denounced	by	the	church,	the	first	edition	was	reprinted	
eight	times,	and	paperback	editions	continue	to	be	printed,	defying	locals’	abilities	to	control	their	
own	image	and	quash	this	version	of	who	they	are.	The	representation	reportedly	took	on	a	life	of	its	
own:		
Thus	the	preferred	image	of	Glasgow	became	that	of	a	Victorian	Babylon:	The	Cancer	of	
Empire,	the	Glasgow	of	adversity,	of	No	Mean	City	and	The	Shipbuilders,	of	the	Gorbals	and	
Red	Clydeside,	and	of	single-ends,	slums	and	exploited	underdogs.	Artists,	poets,	authors	
and	photographers	duly	captured	that	image	(for	it	was	not	hard	to	find)	and	supporting	
documentation	was	soon	created.	The	image	acquired	a	substantial	supporting	constituency.	
Its	momentum	was	inexorable,	and	the	myth	became	self-perpetuating.	(McKean,	1990,	p.	
99)	
The	lines	re	‘duly	captured	that	image’	and	‘supporting	documentation	was	soon	created’	are	
challenging	–	how	often	does	my	research	do	the	same	to	communities	forced	into	the	spotlight	for	
the	wrong	reasons?		At	what	cost	to	whom?		
More	recent	accounts	of	Glasgow	(Craig,	2010)	have	continued	in	this	vein,	bearing	witness	to	the	
ongoing	impact	of	de-industrialisation	on	the	community’s	morale,	health	and	life	expectancy	itself,	
as	captured	in	the	concept	of	‘the	Glasgow	effect’.	Plays	selected	in	the	school	curriculum	as	set	
texts	for	the	Scots	literature	component	continue	in	this	vein:	‘Men	Should	Weep’	(Stewart,	1983)	
with	its	oppressive	tenement	kitchen,	and	‘Sailmaker’	(Spence	&	with	Cooper,	2008)	with	its	
obsolete	tradesman.		These	narratives	keep	the	intergenerational	memory	alive	in	the	present.		
Counterfactual	narratives	emerged	to	balance	the	record,	notably	The	Second	City	(Oakley,	1946)	
which	underwent	a	number	of	revisions,	most	recently	in	1990.	In	an	autobiographical	account	of	
this	book’s	provenance,	Oakey	(1990)	tells	of	rediscovering	books	on	Glasgow	published	in	the	
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1800s:	‘that	was	when	Glaswegians	really	had	deep-seated	convictions	about	the	greatness	of	their	
city’	(p.119).		
I	next	read	a	young	adult	novel,	Divided	City	(Breslin,	2006),	which	is	often	used	as	a	class	text	in	
Glasgow	schools.	Its	offers	a	thoughtful	and	sympathetic	account	of	the	deep	religious	schism	in	the	
city	lived	through	allegiance	to	football	clubs.	In	this	book,	this	history	is	disrupted	by	a	narrative	of	
violence	towards	an	asylum	seeker,	forcing	the	young	protagonists	to	confront	discrimination	on	
multiple	scales.			A	visit	to	an	exhibition	of	artworks	by	Joan	Eardley,	‘A	sense	of	place’i	has	helped	
me	visualise	the	tenement	children	of	the	1950s	and	their	poverty,	portrayed	here	with	a	charming	
mixture	of	candour	and	respect.	These	and	the	television	series	Taggart	depict	Glasgow	as	an	
unremittingly	gritty	urban	environment,	far	removed	from	the	‘dear	green	space’	its	name	and	more	
sentimental	versions	would	conjure	up	(Hind,	1966).		
Yet	when	I	walk	through	the	streets,	the	grand	sandstone	buildings	of	the	business	centre,	and	the	
gracious	homes	of	wealthy	suburbs	and	satellite	towns	tell	very	different	narratives	–	ones	of	
growing	rich	on	trade	in	African	slaves,	tobacco	and	cotton	with	the	New	World.	Glasgow’s	
contributions	to	the	‘triangular’	trade	across	the	Atlantic	and	the	subsequent	anti-slavery	movement	
is	currently	being	recovered	and	reassessed	(Mullen,	2009).	The	massive	remnant	crane	on	the	Clyde	
speaks	to	another	historical	moment	and	its	forms	of	wealth.		As	a	new	resident	my	challenge	is	to	
knit	all	these	‘Glasgows	of	the	imagination’	(McKean,	1990,	p.	101)	together	and	make	some	sense	
of	their	complex	connections	between	wealth	and	poverty,	power	and	subjugation	that	I	move	
through.	My	dentist’s	joke	reverberates	in	my	mind	and	I	wonder	why	the	disproportionate	wealth	
of	employers	was	missing	from	the	Glasgow	stories	circulated	abroad	–	why	are	the	owners	of	the	
considerable	means	of	production	absent	in	these	accounts	and	clear	of	their	stigma?		
Through	this	example	of	coming	to	know	Glasgow	through	representations	thereof,	my	point	is	that	
such	representations,	whether	fictional,	factual	or	artistic,	all	do	work	in	the	world	by	circulating	and	
legitimating	selective	versions	of	a	place	and	its	people.	These	become	travelling	ideas	that	
‘convince	those	who	have	no	personal	contact’	thus	offer	no	right	of	reply.	These	ideas	produce	
effects:	people	‘suffer	because	of	that	bad	name’	which	can	‘positively	be	harmful’.	Furthermore,	
such	discourse	is	sticky.	It	adheres	to	a	locality	over	time	and	resists	erasure	or	revision:	reputations	
gain	‘inexorable	momentum’	such	that	‘the	myth	becomes	self-perpetuating’.	These	confounding	
properties	of	representations	are	all	too	familiar	to	ethnographers.		
Ethnography	and	its	discontents	regarding	the	work	of	representation	
Ethnography	takes	the	cultural	politics	of	representation	very	seriously	after	what’s	been	termed	a	
‘crisis	of	representation’	(Delamont,	Coffey,	&	Atkinson,	2000,	p.	224)	in	the	face	of	postcolonial,	
postmodern,	feminist	and	poststructural	critiques	of	its	'serious		fictions'	(Clifford,	1988,	p.	10).	This	
conflicted	and	reflexive	field	of	methodological	thinking	could	teach	other	educational	researchers	a	
lot	about	the	power	of	authoritative	representations,	and	what	that	might	mean	for	the	practice	of	
research.	For	example,	ethnographers	have	actively	experimented	with	new	media	and	new	genre	
(A.		Coffey,	Renold,	Dicks,	Soyinka,	&	Mason,	2006;	Sparkes,	2009)	to	disrupt	the	disembodied	
authoritative	voice	of	academic	genre,	and	grappled	with		what	the	new	ontologies	of	virtual	space	
and	online	communities	mean	for	methodological	precepts	(Hine,	2000).	Coffey	et	al.		(1996)	
pointed	out	the	ironic	contradiction	between	the	'heterodoxy'	emerging	in	ethnography	in	response	
to	these	efforts,	and	the	convergent	orthodoxy	emerging	around	software-enabled	analysis	and	
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unreconstructed	grounded	theory.	This	argument	anticipated	similar	post-qualitative	critiques	of	
humanist	social	science	from	St	Pierre	and	others	(for	example,	St.	Pierre	&	Jackson,	2014).		
Conventional	ethnographic	methods	of	the	past	typically	draw	temporal	and/or	spatial	boundaries	
around	the	object	or	community	of	study,	but	what	gets	lost	and	found	in	that	delimiting	move?	
Hammersley	reflects	on	the	flaw	in	that	logic,	given	how	fractured	and	compartmentalised	modern	
lives	and	identities	had	become:	
We	sometimes	tend	to	treat	people	as	if	their	behaviour	in	the	situations	we	study	is	entirely	
a	product	of	those	situations,	rather	than	of	who	they	are	and	what	they	do	elsewhere—
simply	because	we	do	not	have	observational	data	about	the	rest	of	their	lives.	
(Hammersley,	2006,	p.	5)	
This	is	a	provocative	challenge	for	those	of	us	interested	in	educational	inequalities.	How	can	we	
understand	the	relational	state	of	inequality	if	we	only	study	one	side	of	it?	If	we	limit	our	study	to	
the	less	advantaged	side	of	the	inequality	relationship,	we	risk	limiting	our	explanations	to	within	
these	parameters,	and	thus	disconnect	‘deficit’	from	its	necessary	counterpart	‘surplus’	elsewhere.		
Burawoy	(2000)	and	Luke	(2002a)	similarly	dispute	the	capacity	to	draw	boundaries	around	
increasingly	global	and	networked	lifeworlds:	
For	what	will	count	as	a	'context',	as	the	'local',	or	for	that	matter,	as	'a	community',	or	a	
'site'		…	is	never	self	evident.	We	should	persistently	ask:	Is	that	a	context	or	an	artefact	of	
design	and	discourse?	(Luke,	2002,	p.	209)		
I’m	interested	in	the	last	point	in	particular,	in	terms	of	how	the	opinions	and	discourses	circulated	
amongst/by	external	parties	contribute	to	the	production	of	the	local	context,	in	particular	by	
motivating	absence	from	it.	In	other	words,	to	understand	conditions	in	the	here	and	now,	enquiry	
and	accounts	of	‘context’	need	to	extend	beyond	to	include	parties	who	circulate	reputations	that	
have	produced	the	here	and	now.		Further,	the	conditions	of	‘here	and	now’	are	not	just	produced	
through	who	and	what	is	present,	but	equally	through	who	and	what	is	absent.	Then	the	link	
becomes	how	do	reputations	deter	presence	and	precipitate	absences	that	contribute	to	relations	of	
inequality?	I’m	thinking	of	the	doctors,	teachers	and	nurses	that	don’t	apply	for	jobs	in	this	locality,	
the	businesses	that	choose	not	to	establish	an	office	there,	the	middle	class	families	that	choose	to	
go	where	there	are	‘better’	schools,	the	racial	groups	that	steer	away,	the	private	investors	that	look	
elsewhere	for	opportunity,	the	government	services	that	choose	‘better’	serviced	locations,	the	
tourists	that	don’t	come	…	these	choices	by	others	elsewhere	make	inequality	happen.	Our	
empiricisim	has	to	attend	to	the	presence	of	absence.		
Social	scientists	are	implicated	in	this	process	of	representation.	We	produce,	legitimate,	and	
circulate	knowledge	of	communities	and	hence	contribute	to	the	social	construction	of	their	public	
reputations	–	positive	or	negative.	This	involvement	resonates	with	different	metatheoretical	
arguments	about	the	inevitable	slippage	between	theory	and	practice	worlds	–	between	knowing,	
doing	and	being.	Firstly,	Gidden’s	(1976)	distillation	of	principles	for	sociological	research	
culminated	in	the	idea	of	the	‘double	hermeneutic’,	recognising	that	the	meanings	made	in	social	
science	will	escape	and	do	work	in	their	uptake	elsewhere:		
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any	generalized	theoretical	scheme	in	the	natural	or	social	sciences	is	in	a	certain	sense	a	
form	of	life	in	itself,	…	the	connection	is	not	merely	a	one-way	one	...;	there	is	a	continual	
'slippage'	of	the	concepts	constructed	in	sociology,	whereby	these	are	appropriated	by	those	
whose	conduct	they	were	originally	coined	to	analyse,	and	hence	tend	to	become	integral	
features	of	that	conduct.	(p.162)	
More	recently	Sriprakash	and	Mukhopadhyay	(2015)	take	another	provocative	step	in	their	critique	
of	the	routine	‘researcher	reflexivity’	moves	in	qualitative	research	as	acts	of	confession	and	
absolution.	They	consider	the	‘performative	effects	of	research’,	by	which	they	mean	‘how	
disciplinary	ways	of	knowing	(through	associated	methods	and	discourses)	enact	particular	realities	
of	the	world’	(p.	213),	to	argue	that	‘different	“realities”	about	teachers	and	Indian	education	reform	
are	assembled	in	and	through	research’	(p.	238).	Their	concern	is	with	how	educational	research	
feeds	policy	in	development	agendas,	thus	plays	an	active	part	in	the	politics	of	knowledge.		Under	
this	lens,	researchers	become	‘”brokers”	and	“translators”	of	knowledge’	(p.232),	and	should	be	held	
accountable	for	the	knowledge	they	sponsor	into	the	world,	and	its	second	order	effects.		To	me,	
these	arguments	are	engaging	with,	and	worrying	the	hyphen	in	onto-epistemology	but	without	
using	that	particular	language.	
Onto-epistemological	conundrums	continue	
The	nexus	between	ontology	and	epistemology	has	haunted	social	science	in	its	struggle	for	
legitimacy	over	the	years.		It	has	been	a	site	of	an	ongoing,	formative	struggle	configured	and	
reconfigured	over	time.	For	example,	the	concept	of	‘reification’,	to	refer	to	scholarly	processes	that	
make	a	‘thing’	of	the	abstract	has	long	done	work	in	this	space.	Barad	might	use	‘thingification’	
(2003,	p.	812)	for	the	same	problematic.	Are	we	just	talking	about	the	same	thing	in	our	different	
languages?		
Barad	(2003)	is	the	champion	of	‘posthumanist	materialist	account	of	performativity	that	challenges	
the	positioning	of	materiality	as	either	a	given	or	a	mere	effect	of	human	agency’	(p.	827).	Her	
arguments	compare	the	assumptions	of	representationalism	with	her	theory	of	agential	realism	and	
performative	discourse	to	understand	the	relationship	between	‘matter’	and	‘mattering’	through		
associated	discourse.	In	this	way	she	is	reacting	to	the	logical	extremes	of	the	linguistic	turn	and	
seeking	to	reclaim	the	material	world	to	understand	its	‘material-discursive	forces’	and	‘material-
discursive	practices’	(p.	810).	For	me	this	seems	a	forced	binary	and	an	exaggerated	straw	man	
argument,	which	only	makes	sense	if	you	were	totally	converted	by	the	most	radical	poststructural	
arguments.	Methinks	she	doth	protest	too	much.		
Critical	Realism	(Gorski,	2013)	never	threw	out	the	material	world,	but	offered	a	rich	and	
multidimensional	ontology	that	could	accommodate	‘realist’	dimensions	as	well	as	discursive	
dimensions	and	their	interactions,	all	being	‘causally	efficacious’	strata	in	the	realization	of	social	
reality	in	an	open	system.		Reputations	as	discursive	constructs	that	take	on	a	life	of	their	own,	and	
float	away	from	any	materiality,	can	be	accounted	for	in	this	inclusive	ontology.	Bhaskar	(Bhaskar,	
1998,	2002)	and	colleagues	(for	example,	Danermark,	Ekstrom,	Jakobsen,	&	Karlsson,	2002)	that	
elaborate	his	arguments	describe	a	process	of	emergence,	being	the	realization	of	actualities	(both	
empirically	evident	and	not)	from	the	numerous	potentials	at	play	in	the	complex	open	system	of	
the	social.	The	emergent	phenomenon	is	derived	from	the	pre-existing	layers	of	reality,	but	what	
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emerges	is	of	a	different	order	and	‘is	not	reducible	to	the	level	from	which	it	arose‘	(Shipway,	2011,	
p.	41).	Reputation	can	thus	surface	and	be	understood	as	a	‘thing’	in	itself	capable	of	causing	its	own	
truth	effects,	not	just	as	a	trace	of	that	which	it	represents.	
	For	me	the	concept	of	emergence	is	resonates	with	Barad’s	concept	of	intra-actions	which	
foregrounds	the	process	and	relations	of	becoming	–	the	‘practices/doings/actions’	(p.	802)	and	the	
‘the	intertwined	practices	of	knowing	and	becoming’	(p.	812).	Barad’s	‘relational	ontology’	would	
collapse	the	analytical	boundary	between	‘things’	and	the	human	agent	that	names	them,	such	that	
representations	could	not	be	separated	from	that	which	they	seek	to	explain:	
a	relational	ontology	that	rejects	the	metaphysics	of	relata,	of	'words'	and	'things'.	On	an	
agential	realist	account,	it	is	once	again	possible	to	acknowledge	nature,	the	body,	and	
materiality	in	the	fullness	of	their	becoming	without	resorting	to	the	optics	of	transparency	
or	opacity,	the	geometries	of	absolute	exteriority	or	interiority,	and	the	theorisation	of	the	
human	as	either	pure	cause	or	pure	effect	while	at	the	same	time	remaining	resolutely	
accountable	for	the	role	'we'	play	in.	(p.812)		
This	collapses	everything	onto	one	intra-active	ontological	plane	on	which	to	think.	For	me,	the	
premise	of	‘ontological	inseparability	of	agentially	intra-acting	“components”’	(p.	815)	conflates	
dimensions	which	lose	any	analytic	specificity	of	their	‘quite	different	properties	and	powers’	
(Archer,	2003,	p.	2).		I’m	more	interested	in	the	analytical	possibilities	and	layers	that	Bhaskar’s	rich	
ontology	gives	me	to	think	with	and	through,	and	the	capacity	to	hold	things	apart,	to	better	
understand	possible	complex	sites	or	points	of	entry	for	intervention.		
From	my	own	limited	readings,	the	major	difference	I	understand	between	the	two	metatheories	
lies	in	Bhaskar’s	insistence	on	the	inherent	‘intransitive’	potentials	(Bhaskar,	1998,	p.	19)	within	the	
deepest	layer	of	the	real	–	ontic	potentials	that	exist	regardless	of	any	epistemic	interaction.	For	
critical	realists,	these	potentials	then	play	out,	being	realised	or	suppressed	in	their	interaction	and	
transitive	processing	through	the	‘linguistic	and	symbolic	mediation	of	reality’(Stones,	1996,	p.	6).	It	
is	this	struggle	in	a	complex	open	system	that	makes	things	both	happen	and	not	happen.	This	is	
how	and	where	absence	emerges	as	an	ontological	phenomenon	–	it	emerges	as	‘a	thing’	or	a	result	
that	is	worth	explaining	how	it	came	about.						
The	discursive	construction	of	place	has	effects	
Turning	now	to	places	as	objects	of	study	and	to	absence	as	a	feature	of	place,	Massey(1993)	would	
argue	that	places	are	constituted	through	a	relational	logic	or	‘power-geometry’	with	other	places.	
This	logic	is	implicated	in	both	mobility	and	immobility:		‘some	are	more	on	the	receiving	end	of	it	
than	others;	some	are	effectively	imprisoned	by	it’	(p.61).	Massey	proposed	an	interpretation	of	
place	that	included	rich	ontological	dimensions	and	forces	that	realize	a	locality:	
The	uniqueness	of	a	place,	or	a	locality,	in	other	words	is	constructed	out	of	particular	
interactions	and	mutual	articulations	of	social	relations,	social	processes,	experiences	and	
understandings,	in	a	situation	of	co-presence,	but	where	a	large	proportion	of	those	
relations,	experiences	and	understandings	are	actually	constructed	on	a	far	larger	scale	than	
what	we	happen	to	define	for	that	moment	as	the	place	itself,	...		instead	then,	of	thinking	of	
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places	as	areas	with	boundaries	around,	they	can	be	imagined	as	articulated	moments	in	
networks	of	social	relations	and	understandings.	And	this	in	turn	allows	a	sense	of	place	
which	is	extra-verted,	which	includes	a	consciousness	of	its	links	with	the	wider	world,	which	
integrates	in	a	positive	way	the	global	and	the	local.	(p.66)		
Appadurai	(1995)	offers	a	similar	treatment	of	‘locality’	as	a	‘structure	of	feeling’	(p.206)	,	which	
dignifies	the	phenomenological	layer	of	meanings	and	feelings	that	inscribe	and	augment	the	
material	qualities	of	spatial	neighbourhoods.	For	Appadurai,	‘it	follows	that	ethnography	has	been	
unwittingly	complicit	in	this	activity.	This	is	a	point	about	knowledge	and	representation,	rather	than	
about	guilt	or	violence’	(p.	207).	Appadurai’s	argument	proceeds	to	highlight	the	increasing	fragility	
of	a	locality’s	structure	of	feeling	under	the	pressures	of	new	technologies	and	new	mobile	
populations,	but	my	interest	is	in	the	opposite	potential	-		the	stickiness	of	these	structures	of	feeling	
that	get	fixed	in	negative	reputations	and	adhere	across	time	and	space.	
	
In	a	project	regarding	family	mobility	in	Australia	(Doherty,	Patton,	&	Shield,	2015),	I	became	aware	
of	the	power	of	negatively-inflected	reputations	to	deter	people	from	going	somewhere,	and	the	
happenstance	of	how	these	reputations	circulated.	Interview	and	survey	analysis	showed	how	a	
locality’s	reputation	could	actively	deter	professionals	such	as	doctors,	nurses,	teachers	and	police	
officers	from	taking	up	positions	in	these	communities,	effectively	creating	‘no-go	zones’	(p.	171)	in	
smaller	communities	that	relied	on	the	mobility	of	such	professionals	to	staff	their	human	services.	
The	absence	of	such	professionals	impacts	heavily	on	these	communities	and	exacerbates	their	
problematic	reputations.	In	this	way,	reputations	that	‘convince	those	who	have	no	personal	contact’	
can	produce	effects,	and	people	‘suffer	because	of	that	bad	name’	which	can	‘positively	be	harmful’.		
	
The	interplay	between	presence	and	absence,	and	different	shades	of	‘knowing’	resonate	with	
Massey’s	point	about	some	being	enabled	while	others	are	constrained	in	the	power-geometry	of	
relations	between	places.	Absence	as	an	attribute	highlights	how	the	ephemeral	discursive	stuff	of	
reputations	can	exert	powerful	effects	on	communities.	It	also	highlights	the	relation	of	inequality		
between	the	advantaged	and	the	disadvantaged	in	how	the	choices	of	one	group	impact	the	other.	
In	the	same	way	that	categories	of	gender	or	race	precipitate	realities	for	the	people	thus	coded,	the	
reputation	of	places	travels	before	them	creating	presumptions	that	inform	interactions	with	that	
place,	or	avoidance	thereof.	For	this	reason,	we	cannot	explain	‘inequality’	by	examining	only	one	
side	of	its	relational	equation,	and	failing	to	account	for	what	has	left,	fled	or	absents	itself.			
	
I	am,	we	are,	complicit	through	my	work.		
These	ruminations	and	that	joke	about	Glasgow	have	made	me	think	about	how	my	own	research	
into	issues	of	educational	inequality	has	been	sited	in	schools	servicing	disadvantaged	communities.	
For	example,	I	recently	conducted	classroom	ethnographies	in	high	school	and	vocational	colleges	
located	in	towns	with	high	youth	unemployment	(Doherty,	2017).	I	went	to	those	schools	in	those	
communities	because	of	their	reputations	captured	in	demographic	profiles.	I	assumed	that	these	
sites	would	offer	the	necessary	context	for	my	questions	and	the	necessary	grist	for	explanation.	By	
doing	so	I	thus	overlooked	the	methodological	challenges	posed	by	Hammersley,	Luke	and	Buroway.		
I	have	unproblematically	taken	stigmatised	reputations	as	my	point	of	departure	and	sampling	
criterion,	thus	sidestepped	the	challenges	thrown	out	by	Appadurai	and	Massey.		
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Most	critical	sociologists	of	education,	or	educational	ethnographers	earn	their	professional	stripes	
in	their	access,	immersion,	close	knowledge	and	passionate	advocacy	for	particular,	high	profile	
disadvantaged	communities.	Access	to	the	iconic	communities	of	inequality	gives	our	professional	
identities	grit,	‘street	cred’	and	kudos.	These	communities	over	time	become	the	‘usual	suspects’,	
overexposed	to	well-intended	researchers	who	queue	to	get	in.	By	locating	and	limiting	our	
understanding	of	inequality	to	what	is	empirically	available	within	these	stigmatised	sites,	are	we	
contributing	to	their	problems?	Despite	our	critical	dispositions,	our	work	re-animates	and	sustains	
such	reputations	by	producing	authoritative	accounts	that	become	what	Bhaskar	and	other	critical	
realists	would	term	‘causally	efficacious’.	Our	studies	add	to	the	violence	that	authoritative	accounts	
can	do.			
Secondly,	inequality	is	a	relation.	It	emerges	in	the	contrast	between	advantage	and	disadvantage.	
Yet,	studies	invested	in	the	problematic	of	educational	inequality	too	easily	slip	into	studies	of	the	
poor,	looking	for	both	explanation	and	solution	within	those	communities,	as	opposed	to	exploring	
the	co-constitutive	and	contributing	relation	between	the	haves	and	havenots.	Inequality	demands	
‘an	analytics	of	exogeny’	(Sassen,	quoted	by	Anyon	et	al.,	2009,	p.	2,	original	emphasis),	that	is,	
exploration	of	external	conditioning	factors,	and	the	broader	context	that	impinges:		
Class	size,	curriculum,	or	student	demographics;	teacher	experience,	pedagogy,	or	skill;	
leadership,	budgets,	buildings	or	library	holdings	are	not	all	that	makes	a	school	what	it	is.	
And	describing	them	does	not	constitute	a	satisfying	explanation	of	what	occurs	there.	
(Anyon	et	al.,	2009,	p.	2)		
This	would	mean	asking	questions	about	magnet	schools	and	niche	programs	sucking	talent,	
experience,	energy	and	capitals	out	of	others.	It	means	we	research	school	selectivity	practices,	
white	flight	and	middle	class	drift	as	processes	producing	inequality,	and	the	political	ideologies	that	
encourage	them.	It	means	we	enquire	into	where	students	go	when	they	don’t	attend	class.	
Absence	and	its	value	for	the	ethnographic	study	of	inequality		
Critical	realists	pay	close	attention	to	absence	as	‘vital	to	any	account	of	phenomena	in	the	world’	
(Shipway,	2011,	p.	95).	Absence	is	both	ontologically	primary,	and	an	outcome	that	emerges	from	
the	struggle	between	material	and	discursive	forces,	and	to	absenting	as	a	necessary	condition	of	
change:		
absence	is	everything	that	has	been	lost	into	the	past,	besides	all	the	infinite	potential	
waiting	in	the	future,	of	which	only	a	tiny	part	will	ever	be	realised.	Absence	is	all	that	we	
might	have,	but	have	not,	been	or	known	or	done.	It	is	like	a	great	vacuum	absorbing	almost	
all	around	it,	and	is	therefore	a	prime	mover:	pushing	and	pulling	everything	forward	into	
new	times	and	spaces.	(Alderson,	2013,	p.	65)	
Bhaskar’s	concepts	of	ills	and	constraints	are	understood	as	absences	whereas	emancipation	from	
ills	and	constrains	is	‘the	process	of	absenting	ills	and	constraints’	(Shipway,	2011,	p.	97)	
Ethnographers	could	profitably	pay	attention	to	who	or	what	is	absent	in	their	communities	of	
interest,	and	what	becomes	absent	(		‘begoing’	as	Alderson	words	it)	as	change	and	its	repercussions	
play	out	over	time.	From	our	study	of	family	mobility	in	rural	Australia,	it	became	evident	that	as	
banks,	businesses	and	services	withdrew	from	small	towns,	property	prices	would	fall,	allowing	more	
welfare-dependent	populations	to	move	into	newly	affordable	housing.	This	would	shift	the	
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structure	of	feeling	associated	with	the	locality,	with	the	flow	on	effect	of	additional	middle	class	
drift	away	from	the	townships	and	schools,	particularly	at	the	high	stakes	stage	of	children’s	
secondary	schools,	taking	their	disposable	incomes	and	cultural	capital	with	them.	Such	cumulative	
absence	creates	the	limited	conditions	of	possibility	for	the	local	school,	and	reinforces	the	
stigmatised	reputation	for	that	diminished	community,	feeding	a	spiral	of	polarised	inequality.		
	
So	what,	who	cares?		
We	should	care	about	how	our	research	or	authoritative	test	results	contribute	to,	and	sustain,		
educational	inequality.	This	paper	started	with	a	casual	joke	that	helped	keep	a	notorious	reputation	
alive	over	time	and	space.	This	provocation	lead	me	to	consider	how	representations,	fictional	or	
factual,	of	‘imagined’	Glasgows	or	other	stigmatised	locations	with	sticky	reputations	circulate	
beyond	the	control	of	their	locals		and	create	their	material	and	discursive	forces	or	absences	that	
are	causally	efficacious	for	these	communities.	Then	I	related	this	effect	of	reputation	to	the	risks	of	
representations	as	well	understood	in	ethnographic	methodology.	I	reflected	on	how	I	have	
nevertheless	bought	into,	and	thus	contributed	to	sustaining,	stigmatised	reputations	when	
sampling	for	my	own	studies	in	educational	inequality.	I	pointed	to	literature	that	has	challenged	the	
capacity	to	delimiting	of	the	ethnographic	gaze,	and	the	need	to	look	outside	and	beyond	any	object	
of	study	to	understand	the	relational	conditions	that	contribute	to	its	makeup,	particularly	the	
absences	that	create	the	relation	of	inequality.	I	then	explored	the	meta-theoretical	options	offered	
firstly	by	Bhaskar’s	critical	realism	and	secondly	by	Barad’s	new	materialism,	and	explained	how	the	
distinct	ontological	planes,	the	concept	of	emergence,	and	treatment	of	absence	in	Critical	Realism	
offered	a	nuanced	architecture	to	think	about	the	complex	processes	underlying	relations	of	
inequality	and	its	constitutive	forms	of	absenting.		
This	metatheory	thus	resources	us	to	think	about	inequality	as	a	complex,	emergent	condition	
produced	in	a	relational	power-geometry	and	sticky	structures	of	feeling	that	originate	and	
reproduce	beyond	the	site	to	potentially	inform	modes	of	absenting	with	lived	consequences	within	
the	stigmatised	place.	Advantage	and	disadvantage	are	two	faces	of	the	same	processes.	As	a	final	
reflection	I	would	like	to	contrast	the	ontological	richness	of	these	metatheoretical	resources,	and	
the	thin	flat	ontology	that	underpins	regimes	of	standardised	testing.	In	Australia,	students	are	
tested	at	regular	intervals,	scores	are	aggregated	and	schools’	profiles	are	made	public	for	
comparison,	and	‘provides valuable information to help make informed decisions about their child’s 
education’ (ACARA (Australian Curriculum Assessment and Reporting Authority), 2017).The	
simplistic,	reductive	logic	behind	these	authoritative	representations	of	communities	and	places	
suggests	the	test	score	can	be	explained	by	conditions	within	those	sites		-	the	fallacy	flagged	by	
Buroway,	Luke	and	Hammersley.	Of	more	concern,	these	‘naming	and	shaming’	representations	take	
on	a	life	of	their	own,	and	start	to	do	work	in	the	public	imaginary	–	tarnishing	the	reputation	of	
schools,	principals	and	communities,	and	informing	absences	by	those	who	are	not	‘effectively	
imprisoned’	(Massey,	p.	61)	by	the	inequalities	cultivated.	The	ICSEA	index,	designed	as	some	
mitigation	of	decontextualized	scores,	has	also	escaped	its	intended	use	and	serves	as	another	
summary	expression	of	reified	advantage	or	disadvantage	to	fix	reputations.		
Back	in	Glasgow	Scotland,	the	re-elected	SNP	party	announced	intentions	to	re-introduce	
standardised	testing	in	2017	and	make	results	public	(BBC,	2016).	However,	it	was	quickly	counselled	
to	delay	such	public	release	given	the	risk	that	such	results	would	inform	‘league	tables’.	This	is	
perhaps	a	setting	that	understands	the	damage	that	sticky	reputations	can	do.		
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